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Abstract 
The ‘social licence to operate’ has been invoked in science policy discussions including the 
2007 Universal Ethical Code for scientists issued by the UK Government Office for Science. 
Drawing from sociological research on social licence and STS interventions in science 
policy, the authors explore the relevance of expectations of a social license for scientific 
research and scientific contributions to public decision-making, and what might be involved 
in seeking to create one. The process of seeking a social licence is not the same as trying to 
create public or community acceptance for a project whose boundaries and aims have 
already been fully defined prior to engagement. Such attempts to ‘capture’ the public might 
be successful from time to time but their legitimacy is open to question especially where their 
engagement with alternative research futures is ‘thin’. Contrasting a national dialogue on 
stem cells with the early history of research into bioenergy, we argue that social license 
activities need to be open to a ‘thicker’ engagement with the social. Co-constructing a 
licence suggests a reciprocal relationship between the social and the scientific with 
obligations for public and private institutions that shape and are shaped by science, rather 
than just science alone.   
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Introduction 
The concept of a ‘social licence to operate’ is largely discussed in the context of corporate 
behaviour and the relationship of companies to those local communities in which they do 
business. In this paper, we examine its relevance for the normative expectations and 
challenges emerging around the governance of scientific research, in particular, research 
associated with new technologies.  
In Britain, the science policy establishment has introduced a number of initiatives since the 
late 1990s which on the face of it signal a collective attempt to ‘make research social’ in the 
sense of developing new forms of engagement between scientists and research funders on 
the one hand, and ‘society’ or ‘the public’ on the other. These include sponsorship of public 
dialogues around emerging technologies, the inclusion of so-called ‘lay’ representatives on 
science advisory committees, and transparency initiatives in science policy decision-making 
and in science itself (e.g., BIS 2010; The Royal Society 2012). The European Commission 
has similarly introduced ‘science and society’  activities since the early 2000s, though the 
programme was subsequently re-named ‘science-in-society’ in 2007, and by 2013 become a 
framework for ‘responsible research and innovation’ (RRI). In 2007, the then British Chief 
Scientific Adviser explicitly invoked the concept of a ‘social licence to operate’ in a newly 
developed Universal Ethical Code that was billed as a public statement of values and 
responsibilities in doing science. But what would it mean to try and secure a social licence 
for research and for other scientific contributions such as to the making of public policy? 
What does this demand in practice?  
We propose to investigate this question by drawing on recent work in science and 
technology studies (STS) that is also oriented towards ‘making research social’, and 
engaging with insights from social licence research on environmental behaviour of 
corporations (Gunningham, Kagan and Thornton 2004) and on the professions (Hughes 
1959; Dingwall and Allen 2001). We consider STS work that has been produced for policy 
and public audiences as well as academic literature. Key sources here include work on: 
anticipatory governance (Guston 2008), responsible innovation (Stilgoe, Owen and 
Macnaghten 2013), and proposals for making explicit the public value of science (Wilsdon, 
Wynne and Stilgoe 2005). 
Collectively, these perspectives reinvigorate the domain of research governance by 
broadening the nature and scope of social expectations from scientific research beyond 
formal compliance with risk regulations (e.g., mandatory health and safety rules in laboratory 
activities) or compliance with increasingly formalised ethical guidelines (e.g., through 
research ethics committees). They also highlight expectations of research ‘impact’ beyond 
those based solely on economic/industry benefits and aim to open up assumptions that 
science will deliver technological fixes for ‘grand challenges’ facing contemporary societies 
such as climate change, environmental degradation, improvement of health outcomes and 
so on. They do so by raising a number of fundamental questions about the purposes of 
science-based innovation, the ways in which specific technological options are predicated on 
implicit assumptions and value judgments that might be open to contestation, the need for 
recognizing and deliberating alternative socio-technological pathways that are effectively 
precluded by those currently promoted, and the possibility of imagining different futures and 
different ways of doing research (e.g., Felt and Wynne 2007). Some of these discourses 
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appear to have influenced the science policy developments mentioned above, but the extent 
to which they have substantially reshaped policy thinking and practice remains contentious; 
key tensions are evident as we will demonstrate in this paper.  
In sum, this line of STS work (especially work produced for or in engagement with policy) 
might be seen to represent a movement and a community oriented towards trying to make 
scientific research more social. This overlaps significantly with the philosophical project of 
social epistemology which aims to “reconstruct a normative order for science” in light of 
significantly expanded understandings of its social contexts and consequences (Fuller 
2006), though each uses different means and concepts. Our primary aim is to clarify how the 
concept of a social licence might help further translate and clarify the normative objectives 
underpinning this collective project of STS-in-the-world. We also consider the implications of 
our analysis for social licence research in corporate domains where the concept has been 
more widely applied. The worlds of research and industry are not that dissimilar given that 
significant research efforts are located within industry, and links between academic research 
and industry that are widely embedded in research systems today. There are also similarities 
between research and the specific case of mining (where much of the work on a ‘social 
licence to operate’ is located) which may not be evident at the start, but emerge as one looks 
more closely at research from a social licence lens.  
To flesh out our analysis, we engage with social licence research in the environmental 
domain (Gunningham, Kagan and Thornton 2004) as well as the use of social licence 
concepts in the sociology of the professions, notably, work drawing from Chicago School 
sociologist, Everett Hughes who distinguished between the licence and the mandate of 
professional work. We also draw on lessons from empirical research reported elsewhere on 
two different cases of what might be seen as ways of making science social: a national 
dialogue on stem cell research that was held by UK research councils in 2008 (Mohr and 
Raman 2012) and the early history of research on bioenergy as a sustainable alternative to 
fossil fuels (Raman and Mohr 2013).   
Social Licence Research and the Social Contract with Science 
Academics and practitioners have elaborated the concept of social licence in different ways. 
For practitioners, it has an instrumental meaning in the sense of alerting private companies 
to the steps they need to take to secure their business in the light of potential reputational 
threats posed by environmental and social justice campaigners, and possible resistance 
from the local communities in which they seek to work. For example, writing on corporate 
social responsibility in Forbes magazine, journalist-blogger Paul Klein offers three principles 
for companies seeking to establish and maintain a social licence to operate: be a social 
purpose leader; give more control to local communities and stakeholders; and build 
partnerships with “the right and the wrong” NGOs.1 Klein suggests that although SLO 
emerged in the context of resource extraction, it has become more broadly relevant, given 
the range of human rights and environmental issues that campaigners have brought to bear 
on numerous industries.  
                                           
1
 http://www.forbes.com/sites/csr/2012/12/28/three-ways-to-secure-your-social-licence-to-operate-in-
2013/ Accessed 15.11.13 
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For academics in socio-legal studies interested in how law works with and through society, 
the notion of a social licence has analytical purchase for explaining some unexpected forms 
of corporate behaviour. For example, Gunningham et al (2004) draw on the concept to 
account for why companies sometimes ‘overcomply’ with environmental regulation as 
studies of US pulp and paper mills had already documented. Socio-legal scholars had 
largely tended to focus on ‘negative’ factors (fear of punishment) to understand compliance 
with law; examples where company practices did seem to exceed legal requirements, these 
were explained with reference to expectations of profitability. By contrast, Gunningham and 
colleagues (2004) argue that the notion of a social licence helps explain situations where 
such behaviour does not appear to have direct implications for profits.  
While academics are typically wary of instrumental tales of the kind related by business 
journalists and managers, socio-legal scholarship does provide more nuanced perspectives 
on the implications of research on social licence for a wider range of societal actors beyond 
companies alone. Gunningham et al (2004) suggest that the emergence of a sense of their 
need for a social licence on the part of companies arises from the manner in which demands 
are articulated and backed up. So, communities require a level of organizational competence 
to understand the potential for environmental harm and spell out the implications in a way 
that forces companies to listen and respond. Economic, legal and social mechanisms may 
be needed to enforce and monitor the terms of the licence which requires community and 
environmental groups to maintain some level of social pressure. The same authors also 
highlight cases where social licence pressures on companies are insufficient to improve 
environmental performance and where strong legal-regulatory pressures backed up by 
threat of punishment are essential for companies to change (Thornton et al 2009).  
In sum, socio-legal studies offer a way of thinking through the conditions under which social 
licences emerge and become maintained in specific contexts. This perspective is grounded 
in the coexistence and interrelationship between economic, legal and social activity – so, 
although the research arises from a need to explain action ‘beyond’ legal and market forces, 
it retains a keen sense of how law and economics shape the capacity for such social licence-
related demands and practices to be articulated, enacted and enforced. By adding the 
phrase “to operate”,2 the business literature gives the concept a further material-instrumental 
grounding in particular types of action that companies can embark upon in order to secure 
their reputational capital in a competitive marketplace.   
The concept of social licence has also been influential in the study of the professions 
including law, medicine and nursing with scholars building on the work of Chicago School 
sociologist, Everett Hughes, notably his 1958 book entitled Licence and Mandate. For 
purposes of this paper, we rely on a subsequent paper by Hughes (1959) and further 
discussion of the concepts in Dingwall and Allen (2001). Hughes (1959) observes that all 
occupations have an implicit or explicit bargain with the societies in which they are located. 
They have a licence to do something that only they do which includes the privilege of 
inhabiting particular modes of thought and practice that might be alien to the rest of society. 
However, their mandate is distinguishable from this licence in the sense that it is something 
the profession claims is good not only for themselves and their practice but for society as a 
                                           
2
 Socio-legal scholars refer to ‘social licence’ rather than to a ‘social licence to operate’.  
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whole. For example, “physicians are not content with a licence to practise; they would like all 
of us to accept their philosophy of health and disease and their notions about how medical 
services are to be distributed”, Hughes (1959, p. 404) suggests. With this extension, the 
profession lays claim to a wider mandate than is strictly part of their licence. For Dingwall 
and Allen (2001), therefore, analysing the licence of any profession “draws us toward its 
material base and the structural constraints of its work settings” while the mandate “draws us 
toward the culture and ideals of the profession” (p. 1).  
For Hughes, mandates are central to the character of modern professions, especially the 
fact that they represent a moral division of labour (the allocation of particular functions to 
certain groups, and the placing of social/collective responsibilities on some shoulders over 
others) as well as a technical one. However, “in some respects an occupation will want a 
larger mandate than the public is ready to grant it; in others, it may shy away from 
responsibilities which others put upon it” (Hughes 1959, p.405). When mandates are 
articulated either by the profession or by publics or institutions that scrutinize, reinforce or 
challenge professional activities, a space is created for debating the nature and boundaries 
of the profession’s social licence and its proper relationship to its mandate.  
The distinction between licence and mandate is particularly useful for thinking about 
scientific research where ‘social licence’ questions arise in a variety of ways with potentially 
different issues at stake. We discuss these further in the next section, but first, it is worth 
noting that Hughes himself explored the mandate of social science in his 1959 paper, while 
Dixon-Woods and Ashcroft (2008) have applied Hughes’ concepts of licence and mandate to 
the case of medical research. But the indispensable source on social licence as it has been 
translated to make sense of post-World War II arrangements for science research funding 
and their subsequent transformation is Guston (2000a). Guston provides a critical genealogy 
of the ‘social contract for science’, the term that became ubiquitous in science policy 
discussions in the United States.  
In the US, ‘the social contract for science’ is/was typically invoked to refer to a tacit 
agreement between government (acting on behalf of society) and science whereby scientists 
would be given research funding and autonomy to govern themselves on the assumption 
that research outcomes would eventually lead to societal benefit. Guston (2000a, 2000b) 
argues that this contract began to break down in the 1970s-80s in part due to the 
questionable assumption that it automatically assured research integrity and productivity. In 
its place are emerging systems of what he calls ‘collaborative assurance’ (Guston 2000b) 
which include regimes of public/private partnerships as well as attempts to democratize 
science by building “institutions and practices that fully incorporate principles of accessibility, 
transparency, and accountability” (Guston 2004).  
In Britain, the traditional social contract between science and society is captured by 
invocations of the so-called Haldane Principle, normally traced to a 1918 report by Viscount 
Haldane which eventually led to the creation of research councils for funding. According to 
this Principle, decisions on projects to select for funding are supposed to be left to scientists 
themselves rather than government. Efforts to introduce impact-based and other policy 
criteria for funding have been criticised as violating the Haldane Principle, though the current 
British Minister for universities, David Willetts, has said that the Principle only applies to 
research council funding (as distinct from research funded by government departments) 
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where he claims it still applies.3 Edgerton (2009) argues that the existence of such a 
principle is a myth, though Bird and Ladyman (2013) disagree in their recent defence of the 
Haldane Principle in this journal.  
For our purposes, the key concern is not so much whether a particular social contract 
granting scientists autonomy exists or existed, but rather the idea of a contract between 
science and society or ‘social licence’ for research. What could this mean in practice? What 
does Hughes’ distinction between licence and mandate contribute to thinking through these 
issues? These are the questions that concern us in this paper. But even before that, why is 
the idea of social licence important for research? Before we look at how the criteria for social 
licence might vary across research contexts, we need to consider whether the call for such a 
licence is appropriate in the first place.  
From a social licence perspective, scientific researchers do not only need a professional 
licence (accreditation by their own disciplinary community in science) or a legal licence for 
certain kinds of research (approval from specialised institutional committees or agencies), 
but something more. What becomes part of the ‘more’ can be debated, but the very principle 
of looking beyond the discipline or committee alone for legitimacy has often been in 
question. For example, Guston discusses the notion advanced by sociologist, Harriet 
Zuckerman, that science does not have the obligations of professions like medicine or law 
since it lacks a specific client. Elsewhere, a ‘right’ to conduct research has been asserted, 
notably in 2004 in the state of California’s Proposition 71 on stem cell research. But as 
Brown and Guston (2009, p.364) argue, such rights-based claims are properly understood 
as a way of initiating wider discussion on what sort of research is appropriate, legitimate, 
desirable and so on rather than as a way to remove these questions from democratic 
debate. Assertions that scientific research necessarily produces public goods should 
likewise be seen as “the commencement rather than the completion of public policy” (Guston 
2000a, p.48, emphasis added) which in turn means opening up the question to societal 
scrutiny.  
Guston (2000a, p.47) argues that science (in the sense of research) does indeed have a 
client, namely, the polity. Depending on the nature of the research in question, the polity 
might seem too ‘large’ and anonymous by contrast with ‘local communities’ of the kind 
discussed in social licence literature on mining – but it is a place from which to start to flesh 
out what lies beyond strict professional or legal obligations in the process of undertaking 
research. In this paper, we focus on what then follows for thinking about social licence (and 
mandates) for scientific research. We only briefly consider the case of social science, not 
because this is unimportant, but in part because the relationship between social science and 
society represents an established tradition of writing and debate (e.g., most recently under 
the umbrella of ‘public sociology’ proposed by Michael Burawoy). Also, Brown and Guston 
(2009) argue that scientific research has much greater power to transform society than other 
forms of knowledge because science has the capacity to become embedded in material 
arrangements including technologies, transform social and cultural relations, and shape the 
environment. Science has a higher degree of what they call materiality and sociality by 
                                           
3
 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmhansrd/cm101220/wmstext/101220m0001.htm 
Accessed 25.11.13 
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comparison with other forms of inquiry. Indeed, material impacts lie at the heart of the case 
made for research funding on grand challenges. The scope and strength of these 
relationships mean, for Brown and Guston, that science has a higher burden to bear in terms 
of demonstrating through societal engagement its right to research specific things.  
We now consider recent developments in Britain and the EU which collectively suggest an 
emergent movement around what we are calling ‘making research social’. These parallel the 
demise of the old social contract with science described by Guston (2000b) for the United 
States.  
Making research social? 
Towards the end of  Sir David’s King tenure as Chief Scientific Adviser to the UK 
Government, the Government Office for Science (which King headed) issued a Universal 
Ethical Code for Scientists. The Code begins with the following quote from Sir David:  
“our social licence to operate as scientists needs to be founded on a continually 
renewed relationship of trust between scientists and society. The code has been 
developed in my Office to help us meet this challenge” (emphasis added)  
Under the headings of Rigour, Respect and Responsibility, this 2007 document set out a 
brief summary of key principles that all scientists should follow – though subsequent 
presentations of the code seemed to imply that this was simultaneously a statement to 
reassure the public that such principles were the norm for science as currently practiced. 
The principles included: integrity in the conduct of research (rigour), trying to minimise any 
adverse effects on people, animals and the environment (respect) and seeking to listen to 
people’s aspirations and concerns and discuss issues raised by one’s research for society 
without misleading on scientific matters  (responsibility). The document contained a 
statement that the code is not mandatory which seems puzzling as it might be taken to imply 
that people could opt-out of subscribing to the summary of what was described as “the 
values and responsibilities of all scientists”, though this ambiguity is just one of several that 
emerged in the responses that followed its publication.  
Asked by the Government Office for Science to assess if the Code was effective in 
addressing an apparent crisis of public trust in science, philosophers of science Stephen 
John and Tim Lewens (2010) pointed out a basic tension in this question.  The code could 
certainly be seen as a way of reassuring the public about science, to “convince the public 
that scientists are trustworthy” (p. 27, emphasis original), but if people already believed there 
was a problem, it was difficult to see how the publication of a code would convince them 
otherwise, they argued. Alternatively, the code could be a mechanism to reshape the 
professional ethos of science itself, “to make scientists trustworthy” (p.27, emphasis 
original). John and Lewens argued that this seemed a more promising purpose for such a 
code, though they added that “altering professional ethos cannot plausibly be achieved by a 
code alone: forms of training, comprehension, sympathy and enculturation are also 
essential” (p.4).  
Elsewhere, commenting on the rise of bioethics frameworks governing biomedical research 
in India, Madhiwalla (2011) similarly highlights the importance of looking beyond the formal 
face of what we are calling efforts to make research social; the recent growth in the 
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paraphernalia of research ethics guidelines has come about, she argues “without the 
churning, debating and refining of ideas and concepts, application to practice and critiquing 
of that practice, the breaking and formation of public opinion, the coming together and 
parting ways of different groups” (p.3) which are essential for normative principles to become 
embedded.  Making research social is a process – it cannot be brought about just by edict.  
Nonetheless, edicts and other codified representations of attempts to secure a social licence 
for scientific research (as well as other activities) might play a useful role in creating focal 
points for the kind of ‘churning’ of reflection, practice and critique to which Madhiwalla refers. 
For instance, the Universal Ethical Code included a statement encouraging scientists and 
institutions to reflect on the guidelines and debate their relevance. While various British 
universities make reference to it in their formal statements of ethical research practice, the 
code does not appear to have attracted this kind of widespread reflection and discussion as 
far as we are aware (though we do use it in our own classroom discussions on technology 
and society with science and engineering students).  
But perhaps a more fundamental ambiguity lies in the framing of social licence issues in 
terms of trust. John and Lewens (2010) spell out some seven different meanings to which 
assertions about mistrust in science might refer. In the format of a public opinion survey in 
which pollsters ask people whether they trust various groups – scientists, politicians, doctors, 
lawyers, journalists and so on -  the question might be interpreted in terms of  individual 
virtue: are scientists (or politicians or journalists, etc) truthful? are they reliable? Framed this 
way there is little evidence either of a lack of virtue or of a breakdown of public trust – as 
many have noted, scientists tend to figure at the top end of favourability ratings in public 
opinion surveys.  
But other allied initiatives from the science policy establishment that might also be seen as 
representing efforts to make research social have indeed stimulated significant debate in 
commentaries written for major science journals, reports for research councils and other 
research funders such as the European Commission, the everyday interactions in blogging 
and social media, as well as social science journals. In the course of engaging this way, STS 
academics have also modified and developed their own accounts of ways of making 
research social.  
For instance, British policy initiatives allied to the Universal Ethical Code include sponsorship 
of public engagement activities and ‘upstream engagement’ around emerging technologies 
(most prominently, the GM Nation? public dialogue on whether to commercialize genetically 
modified crops) and guidelines for greater transparency in development and use of scientific 
advice in government (initially developed by Sir Robert May after the BSE crisis of the late 
1990s and subsequently revised). The European Commission context has also sought to 
promote a ‘science and society’ agenda, participatory technology assessment, and most 
recently, an agenda of ‘responsible research and innovation” (RRI) within its research 
funding programmes.    
On the surface, these policy initiatives seem to bear the stamp of STS research calling for 
science and scientific advisory institutions to engage with a wide range of social actors in 
order that tacit assumptions, both factual and value-based, might be opened up for scrutiny 
and deliberation not just around ‘post-normal’ scientific domains of high uncertainty/high 
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states (Funtowicz and Ravetz 1993) but more broadly where the stakes are not always 
evident at the outset. For example, both Jasanoff (2003) and Wynne (2002) have highlighted 
the importance of looking at how questions for societal/public engagement are framed – 
often, engagement is framed in terms of seeking public attitudes to technological risks in the 
face of apparently neutral scientific information, ignoring how (potentially contestable) values 
have shaped this knowledge or the fact that public concerns may not be about risk at all. As 
Irwin and Michael (2003) observe, some public engagement and science/society initiatives 
explicitly credit STS thinking, but in fact, exist in significant tension with it (see also Wynne 
2005).  
For example, from a science policy perspective, greater openness and transparency has 
meant making Big Data available to all parties (e.g., Royal Society 2012) or putting a ‘lay’ 
representative on science advisory committees, responses which do not get to core STS 
concerns about epistemic or technological politics (Raman, in press). However, these 
tensions have in turn invited further rethinking and re-statements of STS and STS-influenced 
philosophies of science/society engagement and government. These include: anticipatory 
governance (Guston 2008), responsible innovation (Stilgoe et al 2013), and proposals for 
making explicit the public value of science by infusing “the culture and practice of science 
with a new set of social possibilities” (Wilsdon, Wynne and Stilgoe 2005, cover page). On 
changes in expert advisory arrangements, Stilgoe, Irwin and Jones (2006) highlight the 
limited way in which openness is being conceived of with the question:  
“Are we opening up expertise to new questions and perspectives, or are we just 
letting people see the experts at work?” (Stilgoe et al 2006, p.19) 
In reports for European scientific and governing bodies, Felt and colleagues (Felt et al 2013) 
critique the recurrent tendency to assume that society/publics are simply to be enrolled onto 
pre-determined scientific and technological futures (see also Felt and Wynne 2007). They 
too highlight the need to keep the future open to different possibilities and to make a place 
for engagement between diverse value judgments, including those in fundamental conflict. 
Benneworth (2013) notes the irony of research policies being framed in terms of “grand 
societal challenges” while simultaneously defining these challenges as amenable to 
technical solutions alone.  
In sum, recent science policy initiatives do not quite go far enough in terms of making 
research social. In this context, we want to explore the extent to which a social licence 
perspective might be developed to clarify the issues at stake. Given that the Universal 
Ethical Code for scientists already invokes the notion of a social licence to operate, we ask 
what could be learned if we were to take this seriously.  
What might a social licence for research involve? 
As we have noted, the notion of a social licence (and the parallel device of a social contract) 
helps to open up a question that is not normally part of expectations of good scientific 
research. Good science is normally defined in terms of criteria stipulated by the academic 
research community within which the work is located. By appealing to the familiar language 
of a licence, the ‘social licence’ helps clarify the legitimacy of asking that these boundaries 
be extended. The social licence may lack the formal frameworks created by scientific 
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licences (e.g., credential-systems) or legal licences (e.g., regulatory approval where 
required), but is no less important. But why and how?  We now turn to this question.  
Calls to extend the boundaries of the licence to research must first engage with instances 
where boundaries are already being extended, notably around the ‘impact agenda’. For 
example, Research Councils UK (RCUK) requires research applicants to demonstrate how 
they might do not only ‘excellent’ research but achieve ‘excellence with impact’. Impact is 
also a formal requirement in evaluations of academic research by the Higher Education 
Funding Council (HEFCE) and associated bodies under the Research Excellence 
Framework (REF). Just as in the US (Guston 2001), these represent the demise of an old 
social contract based on scientific autonomy, though the precise reach and scope of this 
contract may be in doubt (e.g., following Edgerton 2009). These developments have been 
heavily criticised across different scientific communities including the social sciences for the 
limited way in which research is valued (for economic benefit) and for failing to consider the 
non-linear ways in which research in fact makes a difference beyond the academy. One of 
the more colourful protests against the hegemony of impact in funding councils involved a 
group of scientists attempting to deliver a coffin to the Houses of Parliament as a symbol of 
the ‘death of British science’.4  
So, is the social licence simply another add-on to the impact agenda conceived of narrowly 
as publicly funded research for private profit and economic growth (in the hope that benefits 
will eventually trickle down across society)? Clearly it is possible for the term to be 
interpreted thus, but we would argue that the concept in fact provides an opening for 
substantially re-articulating the relationship between science and society in ways that include 
the possibility that understandings of research impact are also opened up to wider scrutiny 
much as has been said for research itself. In what follows, we use the idea of social licence 
to operate as has been proposed in the corporate world as a reference point to develop our 
re-articulation. Following Hughes’ (1959) terminology, even where the social licence of 
particular activities is not in question or there is a claim that it has been secured (in the 
sense that it reflects current material, economic and legal norms, so there is no particular 
doubt on such grounds to doubt or block the work in question), their mandate (which covers 
broader cultural norms including views not currently reflected in economic systems, etc) may 
still be more contentious.  
Individual/Community consent, capture or co-construction?  
At first, looking only at arguments considered so far for ‘broadening’ or ‘extending’ the 
licence to research to the polity (e.g., Guston 2000), it might appear that science does not 
need to secure a relationship with specific communities in the way that a mining company 
does. Yet, there are two very direct parallels between seeking a social licence to operate in a 
mining community and the need for something similar in the case of various forms of 
biomedical and biological research. Where science requires biological materials or human 
subjects, the need for a licence has been made important following controversies over an 
era in which the securing of such raw materials was taken for granted. Second, since such 
research activities often involve academic scientists working together with industrial 
                                           
4 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-environment-18063913 Accessed 25.11.13 
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partners, the parallel with mining is even clearer as we are talking about the role of private 
enterprises just as in the case of mining.  
What does the process of seeking a social licence to use biological and other materials for 
research involve? Is it a process of ‘capturing’ people on to a pre-defined agenda – or does it 
need to allow for the agenda itself to be reshaped? These have been perennial questions 
even as researchers, research policymakers and industrial partners have tried to respond to 
controversy – the issue always is, how far does the response allow the tacit institutional, 
epistemic and normative commitments of research agendas (Wynne 2006) to be opened up 
for debate? Industrial or economic impact may be one of those implicit commitments, but 
neither the promise to create such impact nor the delivery of it necessarily secures a social 
licence – indeed, either may be the cause of social demands articulated by those 
challenging particular institutional research practices.  
For example, the story has been told of Henrietta Lacks, an African-American woman who 
died in 1951 after a series of problematic medical encounters shaped by systematic racism 
(Littlefield and Pollock 2011). Lacks’ healthy and cancerous cells were harvested, 
unbeknownst to her, to subsequently transmute into the famous HeLa cell line that has been 
used extensively by scientists worldwide. Elsewhere, Reardon (2001) examines the 
difficulties that the Human Genome Diversity Project (HGDP) encountered in its quest to 
collect tissue from ‘genetically distinct’ populations across the world. It is not hard to see the 
parallels with mining and, indeed, this is even made explicit in the language of ‘bio-data 
mining’ or ‘tissue mining’ sometimes used to describe such research activities.  
For the most part, such controversies have been handled through frameworks in bioethics 
that emphasize individual rights and the need to obtain ‘informed consent’ from the people 
from whom research materials are sought. However, the assumptions entailed in such 
procedures of individuals being able to act as autonomous subjects in fraught medical 
situations and being required to take responsibility for making decisions in the context of 
unspecified futures have been widely critiqued (e.g., see Tutton and Corrigan 2004). 
Commenting on the HeLa case, STS scholars Littlefield and Pollock remind us that 
“biomedicine and its subjects do not enter the process of informed consent on equal footing” 
(2011, p.617). The institutionalization of informed consent procedures – including most 
recently in social science research – might therefore be accused of being geared more 
towards ‘protecting’ researchers in the event of being questioned about their work rather 
than human subjects as such.  
Nor are the newer frameworks of group or community consent and benefit-sharing any less 
problematic in efforts to gain a social licence for research. For example, attempts to seek 
group consent in the Human Genome Diversity Project ran into controversy over how to 
define a genetically distinct group in the first place and determine who has the right to speak 
on the group’s behalf (Reardon 2001). In the case of bioprospecting research in Mexico, 
Hayden (2003, 2007) highlights the way in which arrangements for benefit-sharing with 
‘indigenous’ communities from whom plants or other biological materials are sought for drug 
development effectively create and delimit a certain kind of neoliberal collective with rights to 
a share of newly privatized property – as opposed to the wider publics that campaign groups 
imagined would own and manage the resources in and for the ‘collective good’. Hayden 
(2007) gives other examples of alternative benefit-sharing models in biomedical research 
13 
 
that might be based on fiduciary rather than private property-based relationships between 
tissue donors and biomedical research institutions – e.g., where common resources are held 
and managed by a custodian-style trust acting in the public good.  
For similar reasons, Littlefield and Pollock argue that “positing the need for change only 
within science (2011, p. 617, emphasis added) is inadequate. In the HeLa case, it “takes for 
granted the context of expropriation that extends far beyond scientific laboratories or the 
immediate descendants of Henrietta Lacks” (Littlefield and Pollock 2011, p.617) to 
encompass problems of embedded racism and failures to provide universal health-care in 
the United States. Extending this line of argument, a social licence for research in such 
contexts obtained, for example, by providing financial rewards to specific affected persons, 
will necessarily be a limited one that is subject to challenge for the way in which it 
legitimizes, inadvertently or otherwise, existing power relations – unless, it can actually help 
open these up. Likewise, in Reardon’s (2001) research, securing a social licence for 
research in the HGDP necessarily involved a wide range of apparently non-science issues – 
North/South conflicts, for one – that permeate but also extend beyond individual 
communities. Following Jasanoff’s (2004) influential development of the idea that science 
and social orders are co-produced, Reardon (2001) argues that such controversies do not 
necessarily mean that research in such fraught contexts is impossible, but rather that they 
highlight the need to co-construct appropriate social and institutional arrangements together 
with scientific protocols – the former cannot be separated from the latter.  
There is a lesson here for social licensing research and activities around British science 
policy as well as in other domains including mining. The point is obviously not that individual 
or community consent is unimportant or irrelevant. Rather, a key issue is how ‘privatized’ 
ways of obtaining a licence through seeking consent – and in some cases, consent granted 
in exchange for financial reward – can reinforce existing inequalities and obscure alternative 
and more challenging ways of creating licences. Gaining a social licence is not then just a 
matter of creating community acceptance for certain activities, but potentially engaging with 
these fundamental challenges that may well arise as they have in the cases of biological 
research discussed above – e.g., should mining operations be permitted to extract local 
resources for private benefit elsewhere in the world even if communities get a share? How 
was the community decision reached? How were minority voices dealt with in the process of 
creating a licence? Are there ways in which to co-construct ways of doing business in 
communities that radically alter the status quo in which researchers, industry or research-
industry partnerships position themselves? 
Returning to Gunningham et al (2004), the emergence of awareness and consciousness of 
the need for a social licence is clearly linked to ways in which social demands are 
articulated. But how this is then followed up by those seeking a licence is more open to 
question. We now examine this in the case of British science policy initiatives which are 
framed in terms of ‘public’ consent rather than individual or community consent.  
Public consent, capture or co-construction?  
Of the science/society initiatives in Britain over the past 10-15 years, efforts to engage the 
public in dialogue around areas of research associated with emerging technologies have 
been particularly prominent, at least to followers of policy developments in this domain. On 
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the face of it, these represent efforts to secure a social licence for research from ‘the public’ 
in a democratic polity, which is characteristically even more diffuse and harder to pin down 
than ‘the community’.  At the outset the construction of the public that is to be engaged with 
(or captured) is questionable in that the public is typically taken in these dialogues to be a 
cross-section of the British population, yet, research funded by councils in Britain may well 
have very concrete impacts elsewhere in the world, so who grants ‘consent’ for these? As 
we have found, even the modes in which the British public has been engaged with and 
represented for research policy purposes have been problematic.  
For example, we conducted an evaluation of a major British public dialogue on stem cell 
research (the SCD) held in 2008 with sponsorship from the Biotechnological and Biological 
Sciences Research Council (BBSRC), Medical Research Council (MRC) and Sciencewise, 
results from which we reported elsewhere (Mohr and Raman 2012). Hardly unusual for 
reporting of this kind of dialogue, the official press release that emerged afterwards 
proclaimed that the SCD had found ‘high levels of public support’ for stem cell research. This 
was possible in part because the dialogue events recruited a broadly representative sample 
of the population of different cities in which the events were held. Yet this kind of 
summational reporting merely reinforced the misleading idea of public engagement as 
simply yet another method of gathering data on public attitudes. This is contrary to the very 
meaning of public dialogue as deliberative interaction which is meant to bring together 
different parties to reflect on matters of shared relevance.  
Public engagement activities should be evaluated in terms of their capacity to articulate 
diverse social and cultural perspectives rather than to provide a statistical sample of 
individual opinions in the population (Brown 2009; Burgess and Chilvers 2006). For an 
exercise that was geared towards trying to secure a social licence in the sense of getting 
public acceptance for stem cell research (for which, incidentally, a clear mandate had 
already been expressed in the UK Stem Cell Initiative’s terms of reference), it was not 
surprising that such philosophies did not have much impact on the process (Mohr and 
Raman 2012). In Hughes’ (1959) terms, the social licence of stem cell research is not so 
much in doubt given a climate of general interest in new therapies; rather it is the manner in 
which a ‘public’ mandate for this work has been sought that is the issue. If the mandate 
relates to the broader social/cultural/economic norms that a profession reinforces or 
sometimes challenges, then there might be fundamental questions to raise here about 
investment in stem cell research vis-à-vis other health-care challenges – similar questions to 
those Littlefield and Pollock (2011) raise around the case of HeLa and the extent to which 
the attempt to correct historical injustice goes far enough. Stem cell research does engage 
with a social challenge (health) but in a ‘thin’ way without getting to grips with broader 
questions around health, illness and the role of technology.  
By contrast, the domain of bioenergy research we have been investigating (Raman and 
Mohr 2013) offers a glimmer of a scenario for imagining what a co-construction of research 
agendas by science and society might look like as opposed to a one-sided ‘capture’ of the 
public. Biofuels, particularly those derived from food crops, have recently been described by 
environmental and development organizations as a crime against humanity (BBC 2007) and 
a big green con (Farrar 2010) for diverting biomass from food to fuel, damage to biodiversity 
and increases in greenhouse gas emissions despite being positioned as a sustainable 
alternative to fossil fuels. But the field of bioenergy research that originated around the oil 
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shocks of the late 1970s to early 1990s emerged from collaborative engagement with social 
pressures emerging around the problems of oil. This international community was grounded 
in connections with a key social system (agriculture) on which bioenergy depends as well as 
the system of energy. By contrast to the present, where a large part of the biofuels 
controversy arises from the nature of global North/South linkages with the poorer South 
serving as supplier of raw materials for consumption in the richer North, this earlier tradition 
of work envisaged a strongly territorial system (countries weaning from their dependence on 
oil imports with domestic biomass as an alternative source of energy) except where poorer 
countries might actually be in a position to export higher value-added products (Raman and 
Mohr 2013) rather than just raw materials in a way that perpetuates the ‘resource curse’ as it 
has come to be known in development circles.  
 
Bioenergy pioneer David O Hall (1991) explicitly wrote about the need to avoid a 
technocratic approach: where biomass projects have failed, this has been due to a 
technocratic approach which first prioritises the need for energy rather than a ‘multi-uses’ 
approach which asks “how land can best be used for sustainable development”, he argued 
(Hall, 1991: 733). Another major figure, Amulya Reddy, helped pioneer the sustainable 
energy paradigm together with colleagues, stressing equity alongside rising concerns about 
the environmental impacts of fossil fuels and nuclear power (Jewitt and Raman, in press). 
This paradigm suggested a focus on energy services, rather than magnitude of energy 
consumption, to facilitate a wider range of technological options for energy as an instrument 
of “need-oriented, self-reliant and environmentally sound development” (Goldemberg et al., 
2001:330). It was also recognised that focusing on technologies in isolation from institutions 
and culture was inadequate. Their engagement with the social was ‘thicker’ and deeper than 
in the stem cell case. Researchers working on bioenergy in the 1980s-90s might be seen as 
attempting to co-construct a social licence through the manner in which they combined 
political, social and environmental concerns together with their technical commitments.   
 
Conclusion 
 
The notion of a social licence is helpful for thinking through reasons why research requires 
more than internal-scientific or formal-institutional licences to pursue scientific inquiry. It can 
be used to clarify the relevance of social demands on science, though these may not 
necessarily be explicitly articulated and recognized at particular times as the story of the 
famous cell line derived from Henrietta Lacks shows. In this paper, we have begun to outline 
some key expectations for the process of seeking a social licence, lessons that are relevant 
for corporate contexts such as mining as well as scientific research. Indeed, the two domains 
are not always distinct to begin with insofar as some forms of research are linked to 
corporate partnerships. In either case, seeking a social licence is not the same as trying to 
create public or community acceptance for a project which has already been defined before 
a process of engagement has started. Such attempts to ‘capture’ the public could be 
‘successful’ from time to time but may still raise questions about the legitimacy of the licence 
or mandate if it turns out that key challenges or alternative futures were not engaged with 
sufficiently as in the stem cell dialogue case. Co-constructing a licence, by contrast, 
suggests a more reciprocal relationship between the social and the scientific.  
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Co-construction does not mean, as some have feared, that science and science-related 
decisionmaking would be done by referendum. The early history of bioenergy research 
suggests a different model where researchers engaged substantively with social and public 
issues as well as technical ones from the very start. The stem cell scientist, Giuseppe Testa 
(2008) suggests that research materials and agendas could also become modified through 
the course of interaction with societal debate, in this case, the search for less controversial 
forms of human embryonic stem cells. Frameworks such as constructive technology 
assessment and anticipatory governance potentially offer a systematic basis for developing 
such possibilities in a variety of domains.  
Returning to the framework of ‘rigour, respect and responsibility’ specified in the UK 
Government’s Universal Ethical Code for scientists, does it reflect expectations of co-
construction outlined here? The code as it stands seems to presume a somewhat one-sided 
approach to seeking a social licence that centres on demonstrating the integrity of scientific 
practice. To this is added the dimensions of ‘listening’ to public aspirations and concerns, 
and ‘explaining’ without misleading, both of which are still one-sided. Perhaps the code is a 
useful starting point for initiating discussion on social licence matters, but co-construction 
suggests a willingness to rethink existing arrangements and agendas. This requires taking 
seriously the idea of research as a system which means assumptions of individual 
responsibility embedded in codes of conduct are not enough (Stilgoe 2013). A social licence 
for research poses obligations for public and private institutions that shape and are shaped 
by science, rather than just science alone.   
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